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BLANK PAGE

This is not a case about technicalities. The Seventh
Circuit’s outside-the-protected-group requirement
permits an employer to immunize itself from promotion
or hiring discrimination claims by selecting a candidate
of a particular race or gender, creating pervrse
incentives when (as here) another applicant has
previously complained about discrimination, or fails to
conform to a racial or gender stereotype. That circuit’s
effective prohibition against the use of comparative
qualifications evidence in promotion and hiring cases
precludes discrimination victims from relying on what
is usually the most important, often the only, evidence
of illegality.
I.

THERE IS AN IMPORTANT CIRCUIT
CONFLICT REGARDING THE OUTSIDETHE-PROTECTED-GROUP REQUIREMENT

1. The parties disagree only about the size of the
circuit conflict regarding whether a prima facie case
requires proof that the position at issue was filled by a
person outside the plaintiff’s protected group.
Petitioner contends there is a 6-5 split (Pet. 11-21);
respondent argues there is a 3-2 split. Br.Opp. 12.
Either circuit conflict would warrant review by this
Court.
Respondent does not disagree that there are
reported decisions on this issue in a total of eleven
circuits and does not dispute that reported decisions in
six circuits approve of the outside-the-protected-group
requirement, while reported decisions in five circuits
reject that requirement. Respondent does not deny that
the decisions in these eleven circuits are binding on the
lower courts in those circuits. Respondent nonetheless
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contends that some of these binding precedents do not
"count[]" (Br.Opp. 1) and should be "exclud[ed]" from
consideration (Br.Opp. 12) in determining the size of
the circuit split. Respondent offers no persuasive reason
to disregard any of these well-established lower court
precedents.
None of the holdings at issue are dicta. In most
circuits1, this question has arisen in a case in which the
plaintiff and the promotion winner were indeed
members of the same protected group.2 Even where that
was not the case, the reported decisions still established
binding precedents. What the courts of appeals have
repeatedly and properly done in this area of the law is
establish specific legal standards to govern future
litigation. For example, the court of appeals below
applied a four-part standard (Pet.App. 8a), based on a
similar four-part standard in earlier Seventh Circuit
precedents. E.g., Jaburek v. Foxx, 813 F.3d 626, 631
(7th Cir. 2016). This Court itself has on several
occasions adopted multi-part standards governing the
creation of a prima facie case in employment cases.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,802
(1973) (racial discrimination in hiring); O’Connor v.

See Brief Appendix la.
~ Once a circuit imposes this requirement, it would be unusual
for an attorney to file a case in which the promotion in question
was awarded to a person in the same protected group as the
plaintiff, since such a claim would be almost certain to fail. Thus it
is not surprising that some decisions reiterating this standard are
found in cases not presenting that type of claim.

Consolidated Coin Caterers, 517 U.S. 308,312-13 (1996)
(age discrimination in dismissal).
Respondent argues that a judicial decision
establishing a multi-part legal standard is "dicta" to the
extent that the plaintiff satisfies any part of that
standard. So, respondent reasons, the circuit court
decisions that include an outside-the-protected-group
requirement are dicta in any case in which the
promotion winner was a person outside that protected
group. Br.Opp. 8-10. Judged by that standard, however,
a large portion of all standard-setting lower court
decisions, and of all the decisions of this Court, would
be "dicta"; a decision would be non-dicta only if the
plaintiff lost. Courts do not use the term "dicta" in that
way. In O’Connor, this Court held that an age
discrimination plaintiff challenging a dismissal can
establish a prima facie case by showing that he or she
was over 40 and that his or her position was given to
someone substantially younger. On respondent’s view,
the holding in O’Connor would be dicta, because the
plaintiffin that case met both requirements--he was 56
and his replacement was16 years younger. Yet
respondent itself characterizes this holding in O’Connor
as a "precedent." Br.Opp. 14.
The particular officially reported circuit court
holdings which respondent seeks to dismiss as "dicta"
have without exception been treated as binding
precedent by the lower courts. The outside-theprotected-group requirement in the reported circuit
court decisions which respondent urges this Court to
disregard have been cited hundreds of times in district
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court and appellate opinions. For example, the outsidethe-protected-group requirement in Vessels v. Atlanta
Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763 (llth Cir. 2005) (per
curiam), has been cited in 83 lower court decisions in
the Eleventh Circuit. Compare Br.Opp. 9 with Brief
Appendix 3a-9a.
Respondent argues that the holdings in all these
cases, although binding on the lower courts, should be
disregarded here because "[t]his Court reviews
judgments, not statements in opinions." Br.Opp. 10
(quoting California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 311 (1987)
(per curiam)) (internal quotation marks removed).
Rooney holds only that where a party has won a
favorable judgment below, that party cannot obtain
review by this Court merely because it does not like the
reasoning in the court of appeals opinion. 483 U.S. at
312-14. Such "statements," however, often establish
controlling precedent, and when they do may provide a
basis for a later grant of certiorari to the extent they
conflict with precedent in other circuits. See id. at 313.
Respondent also asks the Court to disregard several
precedential lower court opinions because the court of
appeals also ruled for the prevailing party on a second,
alternative ground. Br.Opp. 11. But controlling
precedents are often established by appellate decisions
that rest on several alternative grounds. The existence
of such an alternative ground might have made those
cases inappropriate vehicles for resolving this issue, but
it in no way detracts from the precedential nature of
those decisions. The lower courts have repeatedly cited
the holdings in these cases, and the standard those

opinions establish undeniably is the rule of decision for
cases in their respective circuits.
2. Respondent asserts that in cases in which a
promotion was awarded to a member of the plaintiff’s
protected class, there is an "extreme scarcity of
plaintiffs who persuaded a factfinder that
discrimination had occurred in such circumstances...
" Br.Opp. 13. However, that assertion is based on a
total of only four cases in which respondent identifies
the ultimate outcome of the litigation. Among those
four cases, none had gone to trial; two were settled, and
two failed on other grounds. Br.Opp. 13. That limited
analysis shows nothing at all about how factfinders do,
or would, resolve these claims. It might be asserted with
equal force (to wit, none at all), that amongst the cases
identified by respondent there is an extreme scarcity of
plaintiffs who were unable to persuade a factfinder that
discrimination had occurred.
In the alternative, respondent acknowledges that
there indeed are "meritorious . . . claims" involving
promotions to protected-group members, but asserts
that "[c]ritically" the Seventh Circuit might permit a
plaintiff to proceed even though he or she was barred
from establishing a prima facie case. Br.Opp. 15. A
plaintiff could conceivably avoid dismissal, respondent
argues, by adducing "direct evidence" (id.), such as
proof that a discriminatory employer was so inept as to
blurt out that it was hiring another African-American
applicant because he or she was less "uppity." But this
alternative method of proof is wholly illusory; biased
officials are almost never that blatant, and respondent

cannot identify a single instance in which a district
court or appellate decision in any of the six circuits
applying the outside-the-protected-group requirement
have permitted a claim to proceed on such a
hypothetical alternative approach.3
Respondent is highly critical of the five circuits that
reject the outside-the-protected-group requirement,
objecting that the decisions in those circuits are
"unwarranted... as a matter of precedent and common
sense" and "inconsistent with this Court’s decision in
O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp ..... " Br.
Opp. 14. But all of those decisions were issued
subsequent to this Court’s decision in O’Connor, and
two of them were joined by current members of this
Court. Pet. 17-18. The circuit conflict is undeniable. If,
as respondent contends, the rule to which it objects in
the First, Third, Ninth, Tenth and District of Columbia
Circuits indeed produces "bizarre results" (Br.Opp. 15),
that is all the more reason for this Court to grant
review.
Respondent asserts that, even if this Court rejects
the outside-the-protected-group requirement, it will
eventually prevail on remand. But the purpose of
review by this Court is to decide the legal question
regarding which the courts are divided, not to attempt

~ Neither of the cases cited by respondent concerned a claim of
discrimination in promotions. See Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc.,
834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016) (discriminatory dismissal); Arroyo v.
Volvo Grp. N. Am., LLC, 805 F.3d 278 (7th Cir. 2015)
(discriminatory dismissal and denial of reasonable
accommodation).
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to resolve which party should win on remand. And in
this instance, re spondent’s prediction that it will prevail
on remand rests entirely on the Seventh Circuit’s
effective prohibition against the use of evidence of
comparative qualifications, which is the subject of the
second Question Presented. See Br.Opp. 16-17 (citing
Pet.App. lla-15a).
II. THERE IS AN IMPORTANT CIRCUIT
CONFLICT REGARDING COMPARATIVE
QUALIFICATIONS EVIDENCE
1. InAsh v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454 (2006),
this Court granted certiorari to address the issue of
comparative qualifications evidence, and rejected the
"slap in the face" standard that had been applied by the
court of appeals in that case. 546 U.S. at 547. Ash noted
that there remained several alternative legal standards
used by the various courts of appeals, but did not
undertake to decide which was the correct one.
Respondent argues that "for the same reasons this
Court declined to resolve the question in Ash... the
second question is not cert-worthy today." Br.Opp. 19.
But the Court in Ash did not conclude or intimate that
there were no differences among the remaining lower
court standards; it merely held that "[t]his is not the
occasion to define more precisely the standard .... " Id.
458. The litigation inAsh was an inappropriate occasion
for resolving those differences because the case was
decided by this Court on the certiorari papers, and
neither party had briefed that issue.
On several occasions since Ash, this Court has
declined to address the question left unresolved by that
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decision. But, as is common, the petitions in subsequent
cases presented a number of problems. In several
instances there were serious vehicle issues, including
questions about whether the plaintiff was even
qualified.4 There were disputes about what standard the
lower court had actually applied.5 In at least one case,
respondent did not dispute the existence of a conflict,
but merely advised the Court to wait for an appeal that
presented the issue more clearly.6
2. Respondent does not exactly deny the existence
of a circuit conflict regarding comparative qualifications
evidence; it merely disputes "the scope and importance
of any split .... "Br.Opp. 24. Respondent contends that
seven circuits apply essentially the same standard, but
appears to acknowledge that a less demanding standard
is used in four other courts of appeals. Br.Opp. 20, 2224.
Respondent recognizes that in the Ninth Circuit
"just any difference [in qualifications] will do." Br.Opp.
22. Respondent notes that in some of the Ninth Circuit
cases the plaintiffs also had other evidence (id. 23), but

4 E.g., Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., Opposition to Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari, 24-25, available at 2006 WL 3806381; 1-2, Akers
v. Hinds Community College, Brief in Opposition to Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, 1-2, available at 2012 WL 4842967; Powercomm,
LLC, v. Holyoke Gas & Electric Dept., Petitioner’s Reply Brief, 810, available at 2012 WL 727246.
5

Baxter Healthcare Cor~. v. White, Brief in Opposition, 13-17,
available at 2009 WL 924267.
6 Id., 12-13.

does not contend that the Ninth Circuit’s legal standard
requires the existence of such evidence. Respondent
points out that the Eighth Circuit requires more than
proof of "’similar[]’ or ’relatively similar’
qualifications." Id. (quoting Cox v. First Nat’l Bank,
792 F.3d 936,939 (8th Cir.2015)). But that is the same
as the Ninth Circuit rule that a plaintiff can rely on
proof of greater (not merely equal) qualifications.
Respondent points to an eleven-year-old Fourth Circuit
decision requiring proof that the plaintiff was
"demonstrably superior." Br.Opp. 23 (quoting Heiko v.
Colombo Say. Bank, F.S.B., 434 F.3d 249, 261-62 (4th
Cir. 2006)). But the adverb "demonstrably" has not
been used by that circuit since 2006, and the current
Fourth Circuit standard only requires proof of that the
plaintiff was "better qualified." Pet. 28. The First
Circuit attaches greater significance to objective
differences in qualifications (Br.Opp. 22), but in the
instant case that weighs in favor of petitioner, because
she relies on objective evidence (years of actual teaching
experience), while the respondent relies on subjective
interviews.
Even among the seven more restrictive circuits, the
legal standards are clearly different. Respondent argues
that those circuits merely "us[el different adjectives
and adverbs." Br.Opp. 19. But "different adjectives and
adverbs" are precisely the stuff of distinct legal
standards. The divergent legal written standards
obviously have different meanings. New England
Patriots quarterback Tom Brady may be "significantly"
better than the average NFL quarterback (the D.C.
Circuit standard), but he is "overwhelming[ly]" better
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than the average college quarterback (the Tenth Circuit
standard), and clearly so much better than the average
high school quarterback that it would be "irrational" to
compare them (the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuit
standard). Respondent does not actually state that
these different words have the same literal meaning. It
argues only that these seven circuits "require... a nontrivial difference in qualifications .... " Br.Opp. 20.
But these circuits disagree about how much more than
a non-trivial difference is required.
In 2002, the Seventh Circuit explained that its
standard was the same as the Fifth Circuit’s "slap in
the face" standard. Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d,
1169, 1179-80 (7th Cir. 2002). In opposing certiorari in
Millbrook, the respondent asserted that the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits were indeed identical.7 In 2004, the
Seventh Circuit reiterated that its standard was the
same as the "slap in the face" standard. Hudson v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 375 F.3d 552,562 (7th Cir.
2004). In opposing certiorari in Ash, respondent
asserted that the Eleventh Circuit’s "slap in the face"
doctrine was the same as the Seventh Circuit rule.s
Respondent now characterizes that "slap in the face"
standard as having "broke[In radically from others
already then in use." Br.Opp. 2; see id. 19 ("slap in the
face" standard was "particularly... extreme"). But if
7 Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., Brief in Opposition, 17, available at
2002 WL 32134841.
s Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., Brief in Opposition, 7-10, available
at 2005 WL 3229086.
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these statements are correct, the Seventh Circuit
standard--unchanged since 2002--could not be the
same as the "others... in use."
Several of the seven more restrictive circuits permit
reliance on lesser differences in qualifications where a
plaintiffoffers significant other evidence of pretext. See
Br.Opp. 22. Respondent asserts that the Seventh
Circuit does so as well. Id. But the rule announced and
applied by the Seventh Circuit in the instant case is an
exceptionless bar to any use of comparative
qualifications that does not meet that circuit’s stringent
standard. Pet.App. 13a. The Seventh Circuit decision
cited in the brief in opposition did not permit such use
of qualifications evidence; it completely disregarded the
plaintiff’s qualifications evidence because it did not
meet the circuit’s "no reasonable person" standard, and
then separately examined only the "other direct [and]
indirect evidence" of pretext. See Fisher v. Avande, Inc.,
519 F.3d 393, 404 (7th Cir. 2008); see Br.Opp. 22.
Respondent contends that the differences among
the various standards utilized by the courts of appeals
"have little practical import." Br.Opp. 24; see Br.Opp.
7 ("little real-world impact"). That is demonstrably
incorrect. The petition set out every appellate decision
applying the Seventh Circuit standard since it was
adopted in 2002, and noted that in every instance the
plaintiff’s evidence of comparative qualifications could
not meet the circuit’s avowedly "high evidentiary bar."
Pet.App. 13a, 48a-49a. Respondent is unable to identify
a single case, reported or unreported, in which evidence
of comparative qualifications satisfied the Seventh
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Circuit standard. That standard is a quintessential
example of a requirement that is "strict in theory, but
fatal in fact." Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200,237 (1995). The Ninth Circuit, on the other
hand, has repeatedly held that a plaintiff’s
qualifications evidence met its far less demanding
standard. Pet. 27 & n. 12.
This difference in legal standard clearly mattered in
this case. The promotion at issue was to a position
supervising and guiding high school teachers.
Petitioner had far more teaching experience than those
who were promoted, one of whom had never taught at
all. That evidence would have satisfied the standard
applied in the Ninth and other circuits. The court of
appeals below did not find, and respondent did not offer
proof, that teaching experience was unimportant to the
job of a high school vice principal; the school district’s
written standards minimized only the weight given to
seniority, not the importance of relevant experience.
Pet.App. 12a. This case thus presents a sound vehicle
for resolving the complex and deeply entrenched circuit
conflict regarding comparative qualifications evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The Court should set
this case for oral argument in tandem with Lavigne v.
Cajun Deep Foundations, L.L.C., No. 16-464.
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